This study provides a method to evaluate the quality of legal frameworks for bank regulation and supervision (RS) by developing a comprehensive set of criteria. Using this method, it also generates an original data set for transition economies that allows for an empirical analysis of the relationship between RS and macroeconomic performance. The study presents evidence of a significant negative relationship between RS and inflation and a significant positive relationship between RS and the real GDP growth. The evidence also suggest that past episodes of financial crises, prevailing degree of market liberalization, and the rule of law all have significant positive effects on the quality of RS.
I.

Introduction
Macroeconomic performance and financial sector development are closely related to each other. The development of the financial sector, in turn, is closely associated with bank performance since a major part of the financial sector is still accounted for by banks in many economies. Banks play an essential role in resource allocation, so long as depositors have confidence in the banking system's ability to pay the contracted return. When people lose that confidence, however, bank runs may occur and financial and economic crises may result.
Adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the banking sector may threaten efficient transmission of resources by banks, leading to illiquid and insolvent banks. Legal and institutional arrangements may help to improve the stability of the banking sector via reducing both the likelihood and the costs of such problems. A stable banking sector, in turn, contributes to economic stability and growth through efficiency in resource allocation.
Appropriately designed legal regulatory and supervisory frameworks and deposit insurance schemes constitute essential legal and institutional arrangements for a sound banking sector. This paper contributes to the macroeconomic literature in two ways. First, it develops a general framework to evaluate the legal environment for regulation and supervision of the banking sector. To do that, it proposes an extensive criteria list (a total of 98 criteria) to measure the quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) based on banking laws. Next, it uses these measurement criteria to construct indices of RS to empirically investigate the linkage between RS and the main macroeconomic variables of interest in transition economies.
Banking laws lay out regulations with regards to bank ownership, management, asset structure, operations and reporting-recording requirements, besides other issues. We argue that the more rule-based the legal regulatory framework, the more transparent, and thus easy to monitor, are the bank operations. This helps to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the banking sector. 1 It is important to note, however, that the quality of regulation does not necessarily mean strictness of regulation. Rather, the quality means the extent of coverage of the regulatory framework, along with appropriate safeguards against the risks in the banking sector.
Good supervision reduces the likelihood and the extent of excessive risk taking by banks. As a vehicle to ensure effective implementation of the regulatory practices, supervision of the banking system is therefore as important for the health of the banking sector as regulation. In addition, a --carefully designed--deposit insurance scheme helps to improve the quality of both regulation and supervision by mitigating the likelihood of the moral hazard problem in the banking sector.
While these are all pertinent issues, measuring the quality of banking regulation and supervision is not a simple task. To perform this task as objectively as possible, we thus use various sources to develop a comprehensive set of measurement criteria. Among these sources, we primarily utilise the Basle Core Principles (BCP, henceforth) 2 , other Basle guidelines and documents, and the banking laws of individual countries. In addition, we utilise the recent literature on financial sector stability, most notably, Goodhart (1995) , Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren (1998) , Caprio (1998) , Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) , that provide insights into various issues of importance for prudent bank regulation, supervision and deposit insurance.
The list of criteria we thus propose covers eight main categories of information that appear in a standard fashion in banking laws: A) capital requirements; B) lending; C) ownership structure; D) directors and managers; E) reporting/recording requirements; F) corrective action; G) supervision and; H) deposit insurance. Each of these categories is composed of several subcategories so as to take into account as much information provided in banking laws as possible. For each such subcategory, we then develop a codification system to quantify the information that are mostly of a qualitative nature (see Appendix 1) .
Utilising this quantification procedure, we then obtain aggregate measurements of the quality of bank regulation and supervision. To do this, we follow two main procedures: 1.
We first take simple (unweighted) averages of the set of criteria composing each of the eight categories and then take the simple averages of the resulting eight main numbers. 2. We employ a principle components analysis, which reduces the number of variables from 98 to only a few. The indexes of RS obtained through the first procedure also permit a systematic documentation of the legal quality of bank regulation and supervision across countries. 3 Next, we empirically analyze the relationship between these alternative measurements of the quality of RS and the variables of interest in transition economies. One particularly expects that the higher the quality of RS the lower is the likelihood and the extent of financial crises. Our empirical investigation, however, show no significant effect of RS on such indicators in transition economies. 4 A possible explanation for this result is that the postbanking law enactment periods considered in the current data set are too short to reveal any effect of an institutional change on stock variables that underlie the financial sector performance. In addition, only about 4 out of the 27 observations on transition economies do not exhibit any financial crises, and this does not present enough variability in the crises data for estimation.
We further hypothesise that the quality of RS is related with macroeconomic variables such as inflation and growth. 5 Increasing the quality of RS would improve the health of the banking sector by reducing both the likelihood and costs of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. A healthy banking sector, in turn, facilitates efficient distribution of resources; as projects receive funds based on the profitability criterion, growth ensues. Besides, higher quality of RS would mitigate inflationary pressures that either originate from, or are connected with, the banking system practices.
The current study focuses on transition economies that have all adopted new banking laws as part of their wide-ranging economic reforms since the end of the 1980s. These countries have, however, recently undergone many other institutional changes that may have also affected their macroeconomic performance. To single out the impact of the quality of RS on growth and inflation, we therefore also control for these institutional variables, such as the degree of central bank independence, measured by Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2000) and the degree of liberalization, measured by de Melo et al (1996) . In addition to these, we also control for the rule of law 7 , and initial level of per capita GDP.
The evidence based on transition economies suggests that, other things held constant, the higher the quality of RS, the lower is the inflation rate and the higher is the real growth rate. This finding is in support of the increasing global emphasis ascribed to the development of legal regulatory frameworks for banks in order to achieve economic growth and stability.
The evidence in the paper also suggest that past experience with financial crises, level of liberalization and the rule of law all have positive and significant effects on the quality of regulatory and supervisory frameworks adopted in transition economies.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the method to measure the quality of banking regulation and supervision. An application of this framework to transition economies is reported in section III, where we report the results of the panel data analysis of the relationship between RS and macroeconomic variables. Concluding remarks are provided in Section IV.
II. Measuring the Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision
While banks act with the profit motive and may therefore be willing to take risks, their operations may not always be in the interest of the banking system or of the society as a whole. In addition, there are various sources of uncertainty in the financial system due not only to the domestic but also increasingly the global financial and economic factors. Bank regulation and supervision (RS) is therefore of great importance in achieving a stable banking system as part of the overall economic stability. Good regulation and supervision does not only ensure depositor safety, through various channels such as transparency in bank operations via reporting and recording requirements, but also banks' own safety, through prudent lending and capital controls. A healthy banking system also requires bank management and operations to be subject to prudent regulations and careful monitoring.
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 8 has outlined Core Principles (BCP) in 1997 as a basic reference for authorities to implement bank supervision effectively. Among these principles are those pertaining to licensing, methods of regulation and supervision, information requirements and cross-border banking. We utilise the BCP guidelines to develop a codification system to measure the quality of legal regulation and supervision. In addition, we consider the main elements of a successful deposit insurance (DI) scheme reported by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) based on a cross-sectional study of banking system stability. We view that a successfully designed DI complements the quality and effectiveness of bank regulation and supervision.
In view of both the BCP guidelines and the related literature, we then examine the actual banking laws in order to develop a method for evaluating the quality of RS. To do this,
we develop a comprehensive list of criteria by initially grouping the type of information that can be obtained from banking laws under eight main categories: A) capital requirements; B) lending; C) ownership structure; D) directors and managers; E) reporting/recording requirements; F) corrective action; G) supervision and; H) deposit insurance.
Who performs the function of the regulatory and supervisory agent has attracted a measure of attention in the literature (see, for example, Goodhart [1995] ). It is argued, on the one hand, that the central bank should be involved in regulation as the lender of last resort.
As an agent that should primarily care about price stability, however, the central bank is not the most appropriate agent to perform this function. period, however, current banking law of Poland is not included in the empirical analysis. 
III.1. Data and the Estimation Method
The sample of the current study comprises 24 transition economies that are the formerly centrally planned central and east European countries, countries that broke off from the former Soviet Union (FSU), and Mongolia. 14 Since the beginning of reforms at the end of the 1980s, eight of these countries have adopted two banking laws (or amended their banking laws twice) and one of them (Poland) has adopted three banking laws (or amended its banking laws three times).
In view of the wide ranging reforms that almost all transition economies have undergone since the beginning of the 1990s, this study takes into account institutional factors other than RS that could also possibly affect these countries' inflation and growth performance. De Melo et al (1996) show that degree of liberalization, measured by an index It may be argued that countries that have better economic conditions at the start of the reforms also have the political capacity to establish better institutions. Hence, such an initial effect may be the cause of both better institutions and better post-reform economic performance. In assessing the role of RS on economic performance, the current empirical analysis, therefore, also controls for levels of GDP per capita (in logarithms) at the year of the enactment of banking laws (InitGDPpc). CLI may also reflect the initial conditions of a country, however, since it measures liberalization in a cumulative fashion. That is, if CLI is high in a given year, it is likely that it was also high in the former periods. Indeed, the sample correlation coefficient between CLI and InitGDPpc is 56 %.
To examine the effect of RS on macroeconomic performance, the time coverage for the macroeconomic variables are chosen as the period following the latest of the enactment years of the central bank law and that of the banking law. This way, we take a fair account of the possible influences on macroeconomic variables of both the central bank law and the banking law. CMN point out that in case Ruble currency was maintained in an FSU country until after the enactment of central bank law, it is not possible to talk about an independent monetary policy in that country. Hence, we take the year Ruble was abandoned as the starting year of our data, whenever it is later than the enactment years of either the banking law or the central bank law.
In case a country enacted two banking laws (or two central bank laws), the first period Inflation and real growth data are used in averages over the periods identified for each country -observation. As CLI is measured cumulatively over the years, however, we take the value of CLI that corresponds to the median year of the period under consideration. Since transition economies experienced very high and variable inflation rates in the early 1990s, using inflation data may lead to problems in estimation. We therefore use a transformation of inflation that is given by the formula D=(inflation rate / [1+ inflation rate]), which stands for the loss in the real value of money. D ranges between 0 and 1and reduces the effect of outliers in the estimation. CMN argue that D is also a better measure of the impact of inflation on individuals than the rate of inflation itself.
18 Table 2 reports the sample correlations among the institutional variables used in the current analysis. As the table shows, correlations between CLI and the various measures of RS are 60% or more. One should take it into account that this may lead to a multicollinearity problem when both variables are used as explanatory variables in estimations. In Appendix 3, Table A3 .b reports the panel data on both the institutional variables and the macroeconomic variables used in the empirical analysis. The source for macroeconomic variables is the Transition Report Update, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999.
In the following regressions, we estimate inflation and real growth using ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity-corrected error terms. The current data set is not suitable for using either random effects or fixed effects models since many of the countries in the sample have only one observation over time. In case of either random or fixed effects formulations, this attribute of the data would therefore lead to biases in the estimated parameters.
III.2. Empirical Evidence
In this part, we investigate the connection between RS and macroeconomic variables of interest. We first investigate the effect of RS on the likelihood as well as the extent of financial crises. The data on financial crises are based on Caprio (1998) and is in the form of a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if in the period considered there has been any financial crises, and zero otherwise. The results of probit and logit analyses, however, reveal no significant association between RS and financial crises. We also look at other financial sector indicators such as the percentage of state owned assets in total, the percentage of bad loans in total bank loans, percentage of bank credits to the private sector and the EBRD index of bank performance. Although RS does have positive and significant positive correlation with the last two of these variables, it loses its explanatory power when the level of liberalization and rule of law, both of which appeared significant in explaining these variables, are taken into account.
In an attempt to explain why these results may obtain, we note that a great part of the banking sector in almost all the transition economies has suffered from large amounts of inherited bad loans from the period of central planning. Thus, regardless of the adoption of banking laws to establish good supervisory and regulatory frameworks, financial crises may still have been inevitable within the time period considered. Indeed, we observe that only 4 of the 27 observations 19 did not have financial crises in the post-banking law enactment period, offering too little variability in the data on financial crises. It is possible to explain the finding of an insignificant relationship of RS with the other financial sector variables along the similar lines. Since privatising the economy and achieving efficiency in the banking sector are slow processes, time periods considered in the current analysis may be too short to analyse the impact of RS on the banking sector performance. To assess the impact of RS on financial crises, greater time dimension is therefore needed.
We next empirically investigate the effects of RS on the rates of inflation and real GDP growth. If RS also reflects the political will to reform the economy, observing its effects on both inflation and growth performance is more likely than its effects on the above financial variables, which are mostly related with the nature of inherited banking and economic structures. Given that the alternative measures of RS are highly correlated, as reported in Table 2 , and that they perform similar in nature in both regressions, reported in Table 3.a and Table 3 .b, we use only RSu in the remainder of the empirical analysis in order to gain degrees of freedom.
Hence, the results reported in Table 4 are to be compared with first columns of both Tables   3.a and Table 3 .b. As many transition economies adopted banking laws early in the process of their wideranging reform attempts, these laws were possibly modelled based on developed country examples. While these laws may, at least initially, not reflect the actual quality of RS that transition economies were politically capable of supporting, the revised banking laws possibly better reflect the actual capacity or will of these countries to reform their legal frameworks than the earlier ones. It is worth noting that seven out of nine countries that have more than one banking law enactment 20 have revised banking laws in either 1995 or 1996. This may also reflect the global recognition of the increasing importance of good regulatory and supervisory frameworks.
RuleRS is also an interaction term between RS and a variable that stands for the Corruption Perception Index (higher values indicating greater rule of law), published by Transparency International. 21 The reason for including this variable is to provide a measure of the actual effect of RS on macroeconomic variables by controlling for the rule of law via the above index, while the variable RSu is merely based on banking laws.
22
The first column of Table 4 .a shows that the inclusion of CBI slightly lowers the coefficient of RSu as compared to the first column of Table 3 .a. However, the adjusted Rsquare of the regression increases from 0.24 to 0.31 and CBI appears have a significant (at 5% level) negative relationship with inflation. Next column shows that CLI also has a significant (at less than 1% level) negative relation with D, along with CBI, whose level of significance is somewhat lowered as compared to the first regression. In the third column, we regress D on CBI, RSu and CLI and observe that the significance of RSu disappears, while the adjusted R-square improves to 61%. It should be noted, however, that the loss of significance of RSu in this regression may be due to the high correlation between CLI and RSu, as reported in part 1 of this section. We next include MultRS into the regression, reported in column 4, and observe that, along with both CBI and CLI, MultRS also has a significant (at 1% level) negative coefficient. In the next two columns, we observe that neither RuleRS nor InitGDPpc are significantly related with D. We thus conclude that, for given levels of central bank independence and market liberalization, inflation decreases as the quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) increases. We need to qualify this statement, however, by noting that this effect of RS is captured in cases of multiple enactment of banking laws only. This observation can be explained on the grounds that while many transition economies have adopted banking laws at initial stages of their reforms, revised banking laws are rather "custom made" than quick adoption from some other banking laws. Table 4 .b reports the same set of regressions as in Table 4 .a, but with real GDP growth rate as the dependent variable. In column 1 of Table 4 .b, we observe that although the addition of CBI into the regression slightly improves the adjusted R-square as compared to the first column of Table 2 .b, CBI itself is not significant at conventional levels. Column 2 shows the significant positive effect of CLI on real growth, though the adjusted R-square deteriorates as compared to the first columns of both Table 4 .b and Table 3 .b. The positive significance of CLI, however, disappears after including RSu into the regression, as reported in column 3. In the forth column, we observe that the inclusion of MultRS improves the adjusted R-square of the regression. Moreover, the coefficients of RSu and MultRS are both significantly positive, at 10% and 5% levels respectively. As for inflation, initial GDP per capita and the measure of the rule of law do not appear to improve the estimation of real growth while they both reduce the adjusted goodness of fit. 23 Hence, we conclude that, keeping other things constant, higher quality of bank regulation and supervision is associated with higher degrees of real growth.
In a separate set of regressions (not reported), we form interactive variables to detect 
III.3. A Closer Look Into the Components of RS
We next separately investigate the effects of each of the eight main components of RSu on both inflation and growth. To do this, we run OLS regressions with robust errors as above(not reported). It is not appropriate to run a regression with all the eight components since many of the eight categories, marked A to H in Appendix 1, are highly correlated with each other. Those components of RS that exhibit at least 50% correlation are A and D, A and G, C and D, C and E, C and G, D and E, D and G, E and G, and F and G. Among these, E (reporting and recording requirements) is correlated with both C (ownership structure) and D (directors and managers) by more than 70%.
In the inflation equation, we find six out of eight main categories (categories A, C, D, E, F and G in Appendix 1) are significant (all at 1%, except for D that is significant at 5%) with the expected negative sign. The indices of lending and deposit insurance (categories B and H, respectively, in Appendix 1), however, appear insignificant in explaining inflation. Six out of eight main categories that make up RSu also appear significant in explaining real GDP growth: categories A, F and G at 1%, C at 5%, and E and H at 10% level. The other two categories also appear with the right sign, but are not significant at conventional levels.
We next look at the composition of the principle components, both of type PCa and It is also interesting to note in both Table A2 .a and A2.b that the various components of deposit insurance take either a negligible part or enter with a negative sign in the composition of the first principle components of both type PCa and type PCb. This may indicate that the existence of deposit insurance does not bode well with the rest of the criteria designed to measure the quality of RS.
III.4. Determinants of RS
In this part, we explore the possibility that the quality of bank regulation and supervision itself may be endogenous to other factors. One can argue, for example, that the stronger the local political support for better legal regulatory and supervisory frameworks, the more likely that these frameworks will in fact be adopted. We hypothesize that the likely candidates for which such local support would be present are countries that have experienced such wide scale disruption as financial crises or high inflation rates that they have accumulated sufficient political support to get rid of it through strong institutional arrangements. In addition, countries that have already established market mechanisms and institutions would also possibly have political will to pursue further institutional development.
Below, we therefore estimate RS using a measure of past financial crises; initial level 
IV. Concluding Remarks
This article develops a general framework to measure the quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) based on the evaluation of banking laws. Using a total of ninety-eight criteria, we form aggregate measures of RS, both by simply averaging the indices for the eight main aspects of RS and by principle components analysis.
Using panel data on 24 transition economies, we then perform OLS estimation of inflation and real GDP growth, with heteroskedasticity-corrected error terms. The empirical analysis presents evidence that the higher the quality of RS, the lower is the inflation rate and the higher is the real growth rate. The effect of RS on growth remains after controlling for the degrees of both central bank independence (CBI) and liberalization (CLI). For inflation, the same statement is true only for countries where banking laws were revised twice after the initiation of reforms. Other things being constant, the effects of RSu on both inflation and growth are much more pronounced in cases of more than one banking law enactments since the reforms have started in the early 1990s. In most transition economies, these revisions of banking law took place later than 1994. This may indicate that, keeping other factors constant, revised versions of banking laws better reflect the economic and political realities of transition economies than the early adopted versions of banking laws that were possibly of the nature "one size fits all".
The current study thus provides suggestive evidence that, given the level of market liberalization and the degree of central bank independence in transition economies, an increase in the quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) is significantly associated with an increase in the growth rate and a decrease in the inflation rate. The evidence in the paper also suggest that past experience with financial crises, rule of law and the level of liberalization are all positively related with the adoption of banking laws that reflect higher quality regulatory a supervisory frameworks. Hence, this study provides empirical support for strengthening bank regulation and supervision that emerged as the main policy proposal in the aftermath of the recent financial and economic crises. (1) given (2) not given s. Is credit to shareholders allowed? (1) no (2) yes 2. Lending to the Government a. May banks carry out operations with budget funds on the basis of concluded contracts, carry out money transfers with the organs of executive power and municipal organs, provide for aimful use of budget funds allocated for the purpose of carrying out state and regional programs?
(1) no (2) yes b. Extending credit to government and local government to finance budget deficits allowed or not?
(1) no (2) (1) political parties, social funds, media (2) one or two of (1) (3) not restricted f. Does the law prohibit selection of shareholders that are associated bank failures as a director or manager or a shareholder in the past?
(1) yes (2) (1) yes (2) no c. While increasing or decreasing shares when how much capital reached it should be reported?
(1) less than 10 % (2) greater or equal to 10 % less than 25 % (3) greater or equal to 25 % less than 50 % (4) greater or equal to 50 % less than 75 % (5) no comment
D. Directors and Managers
a. Is there a rule of dual control (25) ? (1) Yes (2 (1) yes (2) PCa (1 to 4) and PCb (1 to 3) are two types of principle components. et al (1996) and its update. CBI is due to CMN (2000) . Rule is obtained from Transparency International. 3. The word initial refers to the year preceding the sample period.
